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MUTUALS: AN AREA OF LEGAL
CLIMATE CHANGE
KARL T. MUTH
ANDREW LEVENTHAL
ABSTRACT
Underappreciated in its importance and often-misunderstood
in its implications, the choice between a company limited by shares
and a company organized as a mutual is an important decision in
sectors ranging from agriculture to banking to insurance. Adding
gravity to this particular decision is the difficulty and enormous
cost of corporate metamorphosis between company types later in
the company’s life. The authors examine the history of the mutual
form, its popularity’s rise and fall during the twentieth century, and
its advantages and disadvantages in today’s environment.
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INTRODUCTION
The corporation limited by shares is among the most common corporate form in the Western world,1 and the one familiar
to most attorneys, entrepreneurs, and investors.2
In that type of entity, a company is owned and controlled by
the shareholders,3 who are permitted to buy shares from one another,
or from others, or from the company itself. The owners of these shares
have certain rights,4 such as the right to receive dividends,5 the right
to vote on certain matters that affect the company,6 and the right to
sell shares as they please to whom they please at a time of their
choosing.7 But other corporate forms exist to serve other purposes.8
This Article discusses an ownership model not often discussed
at law firms, in law schools, or even among law professors: the type
of cooperative known as a “mutually held” company, or a “mutual.”9
1 See generally DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2012).
2 As of this writing, the vast majority of corporations in America are either
corporations limited by shares or corporations of a limited liability type (LLCs
and their progeny) with member stakeholders; mutuals, the form discussed
here, represent a minority of corporations and are often unfamiliar to laypeople. Conor Clarke & Wojciech Kopczuk, Business Income and Business Taxation in the United States Since the 1950s, 31 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 121, 129 (2017).
3 See 2 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 848 (Callaghan & Co. 1917).
4 See Alexander Hamilton Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends,
89 U. PA. L. REV. 735, 738 (1941).
5 See, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1256,
1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
6 Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Seek Public Comment on U.S. Proxy
System (Sept 14, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-122.htm
[https://perma.cc/3N78-EK2N] (“The U.S. proxy system governs the way in
which investors vote their shares in a public company regardless of whether
they attend shareholder meetings.”).
7 For an interesting commentary on how and when such rights are subject
to restriction, see Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812, 814 (N.Y.
1957). See generally UNIFORM LAWS, ANNOTATED, BOOK 6: UNIFORM STOCK
TRANSFER ACT § 15 (H. Noyes Greene ed., 1922); accord. Costello v. Farrell, 48
N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. 1951).
8 See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics,
53 VA. L. REV. 259, 260, 278 (1967).
9 “Mutual Company” in JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (Barrons 2014) (A mutual company is a “corporation whose ownership and profits are distributed among members in proportion to the amount of business they do with the company.”).
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The goal of this corporate form is to align the economic interests of the company with the pecuniary interests of its customers and to remove incentives for the company to generate excess
profits;10 this is achieved by returning excess profits to the customers
according to their contributions to those profits.11 Early examples
of cooperatives include associations that owned or controlled infrastructure and enjoyed natural monopolies, such as places to store
agricultural commodities, docks used for commercial vessels, and
so on.12 The form’s pedigree is Commonwealth British, and examples of mutuals exist in America as early as the pre-Constitutional
Eighteenth Century.13 Its dominance as a form for life insurance
companies in particular is likely Dutch14 or British15 in origin.
It is important to note that all corporate models are templates. In other words, the partnership, the corporation limited
by shares, and the mutual are all organizations that groups of
mercantile actors could establish from whole cloth of their own
accord beginning with a pencil and a blank sheet of parchment. 16
Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual
Versus Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 126–27 (1985).
11 For an exploration of why one might choose one form for a business entity
rather than another, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, chs. 1, 5 (1991).
12 Peter Normark, A Role for Cooperatives in the Market Economy, 67
ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 429, 430 (1996).
13 For an interesting case of a mutual undergoing demutualization in an
overseas context, see Old Mutual, Harvard Business School, Case No. 9-701-026
(Harvard 2001) (on file with the authors). The oldest domestic mutual company
was The Friendly Society for Mutual Insurance of Houses Against Fire in
Charleston, S.C., founded in 1736; it was inadequately capitalized and diversified to survive a catastrophic loss and hence bankrupted by a wave of claims
from The Great Fire of 1740 in its eponymous year. Matthew Mulcahy, The
“Great Fire” of 1740 and the Politics of Disaster Relief in Colonial Charleston,
99 S.C. HIST. MAG. 135–57 (1998).
14 The Dutch contemplation of life insurance firms, or levensverzekeringsmaatschappij, often simultaneously contemplates the mutual form as the
form of these firms. Regulatory frameworks for life insurance in the Netherlands are also seemingly made with mutual forms in mind, though this form is
not mandated by current law. See, e.g., Art. 7:975 BW (Neth.).
15 See Old Mutual, supra note 13, at 5 (“The mutual life assurance structure
was developed in the U.K. during the eighteenth century and was exported
abroad during the nineteenth century.”).
16 See Charles Baden-Fuller & Mary S. Morgan, Business Models as Models,
43 LONG RANGE PLAN. 156, 159 (2010).
10
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Corporate forms, including those discussed here, are types of enterprises that like-minded entrepreneurs might create if they
could bargain with each other indefinitely at zero cost and engineer every minute aspect of the business. Because people do not
have this luxury in real life, corporate forms represent useful
models with reasonable default rules that parties might arrive at
after negotiation; these include provisions related to distribution
of dividends, representation and governance, mechanisms for dissolution, and others.17 In the case of cooperatives and mutuals,
we see a template for a company that is engineered with equality
of stakeholders and fairness towards consumers as core values.18
In the cooperative model, often referred to as a “co-op,” a
group of people voluntarily agree to form an organization for the
purpose of providing a service while, at the same time (through
formal or informal governance mechanisms), ensuring the service
is operated for the benefit of its users (i.e., customers).19 Excess
profits are distributed to users in a payment that may be characterized in a number of ways, such as dividends or credit.20 It is
important to note that, while customers in other areas of the economy
may also be stakeholders (a buyer of a Ford car may or may not own
Ford Motor Co. shares), the co-op is unusual in that the transaction itself creates the ownership interest.21 Co-ops have been
See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1156, 1158 (1985).
18 For an explanation of why self-interested, rational economic actors might
participate in such a structure, see Johnston Birchall & Richard Simmons,
What Motivates Members to Participate in Co-operative and Mutual Businesses?:
A Theoretical Model and Some Findings, 75 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE
ECON. 465, 470–71 (2004).
19 Jim Crandall, Using the Cooperative Business Model as an Economic Development Tool, CORNHUSKER ECON. (Aug. 28, 2014), https://agecon.unl.edu
/cornhusker-economics/2014/using-the-cooperative-business-model-as-an-eco
nomic-development-tool [https://perma.cc/S32D-PHLH].
20 See Margaret Lund, Cooperatives Equity and Ownership: An Introduction,
U. WIS. CTR. COOPERATIVES at 7, 26–27 (Apr. 2013). It is neither particularly
important, nor legally dispositive, whether the amount involved is called an “excess,” a “dividend,” a “benefit,” or a “membership payment.” Other terms are also
used and, in some cases, charges pending in the current period (for instance,
insurance premia) are simply adjusted to account for the amount.
21 Id. at 6–7.
17
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formed to serve a diverse set of community needs from residential
property management companies to taxicab associations, to burial
and funeral societies, to grocery stores.22 In an era before Airbnb,
Uber, Zipcar, and other startups now familiar to us, co-ops of various
sorts were the primary structure through which assets or resources would be shared among a group of otherwise unacquainted consumers.23
A mutual is a specific kind of cooperative model. While a
co-op may simply favor its customers, the favoritism need not be
in proportion to the customer’s economic activity with the company.24 For instance, it is not unusual for a co-op feed store in a
rural community to only allow members to shop there.25 A membership might cost $1,000 and come with one share in the company, but this policy might be waived for farmers who spend at
least $750 in a transaction, live in the county, and receive two
shares; a further rule might specify that only members with even
numbers of shares can run for the board of the co-op in annual
elections.26 These kinds of arbitrary rules are especially common
in rural cooperative settings where certain characteristics (local
ownership or local governance, for instance) are valued more than
revenue maximization.27
Mutual companies typically have more precise rules than
traditional cooperatives; these govern in what proportion and
through what mechanisms the customers own and control the company.28 For instance, in the case of an insurer, the amount of premium (often determined by a customer lifetime value calculation)
See Sonja Novkovic, Defining the Co-operative Difference, 37 J. SOCIO-ECONS.
2168, 2175 (2008).
23 Id. at 2174.
24 University of California Small Farm Program, What is a Cooperative? (last
updated May 22, 2012), http://sfp.ucdavis.edu/cooperatives/what_is/ [https://
perma.cc/2YBQ-UVNN].
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Bylaws of Cooperative Corporation Mohawk Harvest Cooperative Market, MOHAWK HARVEST, arts. 2.1–2.2, 5.6, 6.1–6.6, http://www.mo
hawkharvest.org/assets/Mohawk_Harvest%20_ByLaws.pdf [http://perma.cc
/5875-JL6Z].
27 See, e.g., id. at art. 1.2.
28 This is in part due to the regulatory environment in which mutuals operate. See, e.g., Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523, 526 (1920)
22
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is often used to determine a mutual customer’s “stake” in the company.29 Whereas ownership and associated rights in stock companies
are determined based on the purchase, vesting, or grant of a set
of units, ownership and attendant rights in mutual companies are
determined by other measures having to do with the consumption
of the company’s services (e.g., premium paid, grain stored, trades
completed, etc.).30
Mutual companies are particularly common in the insurance industry and were more common historically in the savingsand-loan industry (pre-1980s) and among community banks
(pre-1970s).31 Many familiar institutions that today take different
forms (e.g., stock and commodities exchanges in the US are less
likely than ever before to be organized as mutual companies) were
once mutually owned, while farm cooperatives, town granaries,
rural pharmacies,32 regional life insurers, and community health
systems have been the least interested in transforming into other
types of entities.33

(referencing Revenue Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172, 173 as to
the way in which premium returned as a dividend might be treated or not
treated as income).
29 “Policy holders are the nominal owners of mutual insurance companies,
and mutual insurers that change to ownership by equity investors offer stock
to policyholders as part of the process; free or discounted stock cashes out the
value of the policyholders’ ownership interest in the insurer’s ... assets.” RLJCS
Enters. v. Prof. Benefit Tr., 487 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J.).
30 See Lund, supra note 20, at 6–7.
31 Hansmann, supra note 10, at 135.
32 Pharmacies are a rare case where some argue the incentive alignment
produced by the mutual form is both modern and desirable, especially in a time
of rising healthcare and pharmaceutical costs. Mutual Drug Company of North
Carolina is an example of a pharmaceutical wholesale business owned by its
customers. Colorado was among the first states to recognize pharmacies as a
valid use for the mutual form, with Schlotz Mutual Drug Co. appearing in the
Colorado State Board of Pharmacy directory in 1922; few mutual pharmacies
survived the post-WWII consolidation trend in pharmacies and the growth of
national brands. See COLORADO STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY, TWENTY-NINTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY OF COLORADO FOR THE
YEAR ENDING JULY 2, 1922, ST. BOARD PHARMACY 39 (1922) (showing Schlotz
Mutual Drug Co.’s presence in nine locations in and around Denver).
33 “[D]emutualization [is] [t]he conversion of a mutual society into a corporate
entity.” PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL TERMS 156 (1997).
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Above: Tobacco storage for farmers in Viroqua, Wisconsin owned
by a traditional mutual company.34
Mutual companies are further divided into two types: traditional mutuals and mutual holding companies.35 Traditional
mutuals are designed for high levels of service with optimal incentive alignment between consumers and the company; this comes
at the expense of access to capital and strategic or managerial
See U.S. Dep’t of Interior, National Park Service, National Register of
Historic Places, Registration Form for Northern Wisconsin Co-op Tobacco Pool
Warehouse (Sept. 30, 2003); see also Kelly Slentz, Into the Driftless—Growing
Tobacco (Part Two), ROOTSTOCK (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.rootstock.coop
/cropp-culture/into-the-driftless-growing-tobacco-part-two-3/ [https://perma.cc
/3AVP-RR2K]. Photo taken in 2017 by the author, K. Muth.
35 Fabio R. Chaddad & Michael L. Cook, Understanding New Cooperative
Models: An Ownership-Control Rights Typology, 26 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 348, 351
(2004).
34
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flexibility.36 However, members of the mutual are willing to subject
the company to these constraints, as they enjoy both the increased
performance of the company (in terms of customer service or product innovation, for instance) and economic benefits.37 Mutual
holding companies were designed to have many of the benefits of
a traditional mutual while also allowing the company a greater
degree of flexibility to engage in mergers-and-acquisitions activity outside the firm’s traditional industry or to access capital more
easily (and on better terms).38 When a mutual wishes to abandon
the mutual form, it engages in a process known as “demutualization.”39 Demutualization can (confusingly) refer to either the conversion of a traditional mutual into a mutual holding company or
the transformation of a traditional mutual into a stock company
limited by shares;40 both transitions are discussed here. In the
post-WWII era, demutualization has become something of a trend
among traditional mutual companies seeking to restructure
themselves away from the traditional mutual model.41
This Article examines which changes in the understanding of
firm incentives and economics, changes in legislation or regulation,
It is difficult for a mutual to explore entering a new line of business, for
instance, because these customers will upset the balance of revenues that produce the stakeholdership calculation for the mutual. Consider, for instance, a
mutually owned health insurer that opens a hospital; while the revenues and
stakes in the insurance business are relatively predictable (customers are
known, premium amounts are predictable), the mutual stakeholdership implications from hospital revenues are much less obvious and very unpredictable.
See John Haydon & Robin Swindell, Special ReportɆDiversification Challenges
and Opportunities for Mutuals, WILLIS RE, http://www.willisre.com/docu
ments/Media_Room/Publication/Diversification_Challenges_and_Opportunities
_for_Mutuals.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLB4-RN4M].
37 Kimberly M. Inman, Comment, The Mutual Holding Company: A New Opportunity For Mutual Insurance Companies?, 42 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 677, 679 (1998).
38 Id. at 682, 692 n.172.
39 See RLJCS Enters. v. Prof. Benefit Tr., 487 F.3d 494, 495–97 (7th Cir.
2007) (Easterbrook, C.J.).
40 See In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 310, 311
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d
267, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 156 F. Supp.
2d 254, 258–60 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (detailing the underlying fact pattern).
41 Note, Developing a Demutualization Acquisition Strategy for Private Equity Firms, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906, 1910 (1997).
36
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and changes in market expectations may have caused the mutual
form to fall out of favor during the past several decades.42
To better understand which corporations this Article’s analysis addresses, see Figure 1 below.
Fig. 1: A Simplified Taxonomy of Companies by Ownership or Control Mechanism43
x

Companies
x Corporations
x Companies Established by Participating Members
x Traditional LLCs
x Member-Managed Corporations of Various Types
x Merchant Companies (Commonwealth)
x Companies Limited By Shares
x Companies with Public Offerings
x Companies with Limited Offerings
x Companies with Equity Traded on
Coupons/Tickets
x Companies with Equity Traded on Ledger
x Companies Limited By Guarantee (No Shares or
Dividends)
x Universities
x Public Charities
x Municipalities
x Professional Partnership Forms
x Companies Established by Royal Charter
(Commonwealth)
x Partnerships
x Traditional (at Common Law) Partnerships
x De Facto Partnerships Among Proprietors
x LLPs and Limited-Liability Forms
x Professional Partnership Forms
x Special-Purpose Investment Vehicles
x Other Partnership Models

42 Gregory N. Racz, Note, No Longer Your Piece of the Rock: The Silent Reorganization of Mutual Life Insurance Firms, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 999, 1002–03 (1998).
43 This is an intentionally incomplete taxonomy. It is not meant to be exhaustive;
instead, it is meant to portray the space mutual companies and mutual benefit
organizations occupy relative to other types of companies. See Standard Taxonomies, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/edgartaxonomies.shtml [https://perma
.cc/HCB5-QH95] (listing numerous examples of complete taxonomies).
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Cooperative Models
x Traditional Cooperatives
x Customer-Owned Grocery Stores
x Granaries and Foodstuffs Storage
x Farm Implement Lend-Lease Associations
x Mutual Companies
x Traditional Mutuals
x Stock Exchanges
x Commodity Brokerage Associations
x Savings-and-Loan Associations
x Insurers of Various Types (Life, Property &
Casualty, etc.)
x Mutual Holding Companies
x Insurance Companies
x Banks and Investment Management
Companies
x Diversified Holding Companies of Various
Kinds
I. TO MUTUAL OR NOT TO MUTUAL: THAT IS THE QUESTION

Assuming, ceteris paribus, actors prefer structures that are
expected to maximize operational efficiency, access to capital, and
returns to stakeholders,44 the mutual form is not an obvious choice
when creating an entity. It is less appealing in terms of flexibility
than stock companies when considering that the process of demutualization is financially demanding and procedurally nontrivial.45 The mutual form, with the exception of some industries
where special protections exist, is not particularly tax-efficient either, and accounting for small stakes held by a large number of
customers can be administratively burdensome.46
See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms
and Investment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1985).
45 See Racz, supra note 42, at 1005.
46 For an example of how complex these calculations can be, consider the
following:
When the companies demutualized, policyholders [ ] therefore
retained their policies and continued to pay the same premiums. They no longer, however, held mutual rights, and therefore could not vote on corporate decisions and had no interest
in the surpluses of the new companies. In exchange for the lost
44
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Fig. 2: Comparison of Interest Alignment, Access to
Capital Among Example Corporation Types

So why are there any mutuals at all? The popularity of mutuals persisted, with varying levels of enthusiasm, from 1870 to 1970.47 This
was followed by a trend away from mutuals, which can be thought of
as the prevailing trend in the period from 1970 to present. Understanding these two opposite phenomena requires understanding
how incentives affect corporate structural decisions.48
mutual rights, the companies provided policyholders with the option of receiving stock in the new companies or receiving a cash
payment in lieu of stock. When determining how much stock to
give policyholders, the companies calculated a “fixed” component to
correspond to policyholders’ loss of voting rights, and a “variable” component designed to measure “the policyholders’ contribution to the surplus of the company.” Although the companies
used slightly different methods to measure their policyholders’
contribution to the company’s surplus, all obtained independent
actuarial opinions that the methods were “fair and equitable.”
Dorrance v. U.S., 877 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (D. Ariz. 2012) (internal citations
omitted).
47 See Lisa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before
and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 727–38 (2000).
48 Update on Mutual Holding Companies, New York Annual Meeting, SOC’Y
ACTUARIES, 24 RECORD 1, 10–11 (Oct. 1998).
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General America, an insurer, is one example of a company
that has followed these major trends. General America began as
a stock company and continued that way until 1946, when it became a mutual.49 In 1997, the company began the demutualization process and eventually (in that same year) became a mutual
holding company (GenAmerica Corporation is the intermediate stock
holding company that may be familiar to readers of this Article).50
More than a matter of fashion, firms gravitate toward certain corporate forms and not others for a variety of reasons and, in
this case, these forces are chiefly economic rather than regulatory.51
The decision to create a mutual company is a hefty one and
normally made with significant planning and discussion of alternatives. Similarly, the conversion from a mutual company to a
mutual holding company or traditional stock company should be
viewed as a serious decision that is difficult, though not impossible,
to reverse.52 As one contemplates the waves of demutualization
experienced in various industries, considering the prevalence of
these transformations during historical periods is informative.53
In 1975, more than two thirds of savings-and-loan (S&L) assets in the United States were held and managed by cooperative
organizations of some type, the vast majority of those having been
organized as mutual companies.54 Between 1975 and 1989, over 750
mutuals converted to stock associations, and by 1990 less than a
quarter of S&L assets55 were held by mutuals.56 A generation later,
the insurance industry is witnessing a similar shift.57
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
51 Id. at 10.
52 Id. at 6–7.
53 Stephanie O. Crofton, Luis G. Dopico & James A. Wilcox, Conversions
and Capital of Mutual Thrifts: Connections, Problems, and Proposals for Credit
Unions, 30 ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 31, 34, 36–37 (2012).
54 See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, Table 788 (97th ed. 1976).
55 Among other things, this was influenced by Federal Home Loan Bank
Board rules that protected post-conversion companies from hostile takeover, one
of many examples of the legislative or regulatory environment’s effect on the desirability of conversion. See Crofton, Dopico & Wilcox, supra note 53, at 34, 36–37.
56 See A Unified Federal Charter for Banks and Saving Associations: A Staff
Study, 10 FDIC: BANKING REV. 1, 11 (1997).
57 Mutual life insurance juggernauts John Hancock, MetLife, and Prudential demutualized and converted into stock companies with IPOs greater than
49

50
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The prime rationale (theoretically and practically) for mutual enterprises to demutualize (either becoming a mutual holding
company or a stock company) is to gain access to capital on better
terms.58 However, other considerations contribute to the decision
to demutualize and the subsequent increased firm performance
that often results.59 For instance, the mutual structure and the mutual form is generally tax-inefficient, which has been considered a
constraint to growth.60 In particular, because mutuals cannot generally merge successfully with traditional stock companies without
compromising their structures, mutuals have traditionally only
had very limited opportunities to pursue mergers-and-acquisitions
transactions and have been even less attractive as targets.61 This
may explain why, in the case of insurers, companies tend to acquire
or enter riskier lines of business (or noninsurance businesses) following a demutualization but have difficulty finding allies or partners
with whom to make similar maneuvers prior to demutualization.62
II. TWO FLAVORS OF MUTUALS
The traditional mutual company and the mutual holding
company are similar yet different. While both are very different
from a traditional company limited by shares, legal scholars,
in-house counsel, and the customers of mutually held companies
often underestimate the difference between the two forms.63
$1 billion in the 1990s, having substantial market effects on how the life insurance industry is organized. While over half of life insurance policies by policy
value were represented by mutual companies in 1986, that portion had decreased to only 15 percent fifteen years later (2001). See Lorraine Gorski, Life
in the Public Eye: Newly Demutualized Life Insurers Adjust to the Glare of
Shareholder Scrutiny, BEST’S REV. 22–29 (Nov. 2002).
58 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 12.
59 See Gordon O. Pehrson, Jr., David R. Woodward, & James H. Mann, Demutualization of Insurance Companies: A Comparative Analysis of Issues and
Techniques, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 709, 736–37 (1991–92).
60 James M. Carson, Mark D. Forster, & Michael J. McNamara, Changes in
Ownership Structure: Theory and Evidence from Life Insurer Demutualizations, 21 J. INS. ISSUES 1, 15 (1998).
61 See James A. Smallenberger, Restructuring Mutual Life Insurance Companies: A Practical Guide Through the Process, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 519–20 (2001).
62 Id. at 519.
63 See generally Marianne Bonner, Stock Insurer Versus Mutual Insurer,
BALANCE (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/stock-insurer-versus-mu
tual-insurer-462504 [https://perma.cc/FPB7-4699].

2018] MUTUALS: AREA OF LEGAL CLIMATE CHANGE

611

First, it is important to establish that not all states allow,
and even fewer encourage, both mutual forms.64 States like Wisconsin have traditionally had both kinds of mutual companies.65
The state has an especially rich history of dairy and other agricultural cooperatives using these forms.66 Meanwhile, states in New
England (like Massachusetts) have regulatory frameworks that
clearly favor traditional mutuals while allowing, but not favoring,
mutual holding company forms.67 Western states, like California and
Montana, also have regulatory postures that allow mutuals, but tend
to be less specific as to mutual holding companies.68 Nebraska is
the most restrictive of the states that allow mutual holding companies, mandating that each mutual holding company have only
one subsidiary.69 Other states have special rules regarding demutualization, but these go beyond the scope of this Article.70
The advantage of a mutual holding company over a traditional mutual relates to the mutual holding company’s access to
capital markets and its ability to raise capital from outside parties
on better terms.71 This is accomplished by setting up a holding
64 As of this writing, mutual holding company forms, or other forms that
behave and are structured like mutual holding companies, are allowed by statute
in California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The
District of Columbia also offers a mutual holding company form. See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 4–5; see also Inman, supra note 37,
at 684, 684 n.68.
65 See Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, Comparison of
Wisconsin and Iowa Insurance Regulation, WISCONSIN.GOV, https://oci.wi.gov
/Documents/Companies/FinCunaCMISCompIAWI-200701.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Z29T-6W2P].
66 See Greg Lawless, Humble Beginnings, U. WIS. CTR. COOPERATIVES, Bulletin No. 2, at 1–3 (Aug. 2002), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/pdf/Bulletins/bulle
tin_08_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6DA-FJVX].
67 See Worcester Bus. J., Depositor-owned banks in Mass. angling to go public, WBJOURNAL (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.wbjournal.com/article/20140331
/PRINTEDITION/303279998/depositor-owned-banks-in-mass-angling-to-go-pub
lic [https://perma.cc/QP33-FEL2].
68 See CAL. INS. CODE § 4097.01(m)(1)–(3) (1998); see also MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 33-3-216 (2009).
69 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 9.
70 Iowa, for instance, has special rules that distinguish mutuals that will
have an initial public offering of a stock company (an “IPO”) from ones that
will not. See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 4.
71 Id. at 6.
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company (as the name suggests) which owns fifty-one percent72
(or more) of the equity in the operating company. The remainder
of the equity can be used as consideration in public or private
transactions involving noncustomer investors (these include the
sale of equity, the use of equity as collateral in transactions, or
the use of equity to purchase other entities).73 The company can
also, of course, simply sell stock to noncustomers either in an IPO
or through private auctions.74 Following the demutualization of
American Family Insurance, the company released press materials explaining this new possibility: “While a mutual holding company structure would allow American Family to consider the sale
of stock to raise capital, it has no plans do so.”75 By contrast, a
traditional mutual cannot raise money in this way because its equity is “locked up” and owned by its customers, whose shares are
tied to the consumption of the company’s goods and services and
who do not have the right to buy or sell their shares76 (in the case
of an agricultural mutual, the farmers transacting in commodities; in the case of an insurance company, the policyholders enjoying the protection of the insurance products the company offers).77
Central documents of a traditional mutual generally not only avoid
granting equity to noncustomers, but also prohibit noncustomer
ownership of equity.78 It is important to recognize that the holding company layer of the mutual holding company is not in the
In some states, 50.1 percent. Id. at 3.
See id. at 12.
74 The direct sale of shares is somewhat uncommon in the case of a mutual
holding company conversion, but a substantially more common feature of full
demutualizations. Sales of voting stock to noncustomers (non-policyholders in
the insurance context) after a mutual holding company conversion generally
require approval of the mutual holding company board and may also require
approval of the relevant regulatory bodies. See id. at 3.
75 Policyholders approve American Family’s Plan for organizational structure change, AM. FAM. INS. (Dec. 7, 2016), http://newsroom.amfam.com/12-7-16
-mhc-conversion-vote/ [https://perma.cc/B3RC-SHBF].
76 Capital Markets Special Report, NAT’L ASS’N. INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://
www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/150428.htm [https://perma.cc/E9UZ-5B2F].
77 See Andrew Beattie, A Primer for Investing in Agriculture, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/12/agriculture-primer.asp [https://
perma.cc/FD5Y-E26X] (showing that a farmer’s produce is his commodity); see
also Capital Markets Special Report, supra note 76.
78 See Lund, supra note 20, at 4. Note that this does not include past customers.
In other words, if Company A is a traditional mutual life insurer and a customer
was, for a time but not currently, a customer of Company A, that customer may have
72

73
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business of its subsidiaries or partner companies; it is a holding
company, not an insurance company, for instance.79
From a legal perspective, the best way to think about the
difference between a traditional mutual and a mutual holding
company is to think of a shareholder’s bundle of rights.80 These
rights fall into two groups: governance rights and operating rights.81
The governance rights relate to how the stakeholder gives his or
her input on how the company is run, such as voting in board
elections. The operating rights pertain to how the stakeholder interacts with the company as a customer, such as access to a grain
shed to store excess grain produced on one’s farm82 or ability to
force the mutual to pay beneficiaries upon the death of an insured.83 Figure 3 shows examples of differentiated rights.
Fig. 3: A List84 of Rights Mutual Stakeholders Enjoy,
Segregated into Two Categories
x Governance Rights
x The right to cast a vote for who is a director of
the mutual
x The right to cast a vote for demutualization
x The right to cast a vote approving or disapproving
of a merger

remaining equity (and even voting) rights as to the mutual company despite
not having a current policyholder relationship to Company A. See id. at 31–33.
79 In many states, including California, Illinois, New York, and others, the
holding company layer, though a general-purpose separate entity, is regulated
as an insurance company and subject to the inquiries and decisions of insurance
regulators. This is not true in all states. Stephen J. Olsen, Chuck vs. Goliath:
Basis of Stock Received in Demutualization of Mutual Insurance Companies, 9
HOUS. BUS. & TAX J. 360, 366 (2009).
80 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 3.
81 See id.
82 In the case of an agricultural cooperative structured as a mutual. See
Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism?
Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U.L.
REV. 1409, 1423 (2011).
83 In the case of a mutual life insurance company. See Update on Mutual
Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 3.
84 This list is incomplete and for illustrative purposes only. In the case of a
commodities exchange, for instance, a stakeholder customer might have hundreds of transactional operating rights. See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at
584–85; see also Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 3.
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x

Operating Rights
x The right to make a claim as the holder of an
insurance policy
x The right to cause a redemption or pay-on-demand
event in a commodity market
x The right to force a clear-or-fail decision as to a
trade on a stock market

In a traditional mutual, the customer stakeholder holds
the whole bundle of rights; the governance and operating rights
run together.85 In fact, even if the stakeholder desires it, the
stakeholder cannot split the rights and sell them separately or
dispose of them as he or she pleases.86
Conversely, in the case of a mutual holding company, the
rights exist separately. The governance rights sit in the mutual
holding company, while the operating rights are enjoyed by the
stakeholder.87 In other words, the mutual holding company holds
the majority of votes at all times in its subsidiary operating company,
but customers still enjoy the operating rights they would have enjoyed in a traditional mutual relationship, whether the company is
an exchange operating company, an insurer, or something else.88
III. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE DECISION
Once a company establishes that the mutual form it desires
to take is legally viable in the jurisdiction of its incorporation, the
company customarily engages in some form of economic analysis
to determine the impact of such a decision.89
In the case of a mutual holding company, the economics are
often as much related to the time involved as to the money involved. Mutual holding company conversions, now that they are
a well-understood transformation and can be planned to a great
extent ahead of time, can be completed in as little as nine or ten
months.90 The costs of a mutual holding company transformation
U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF COMMODITY EX21, 195 (2009).
86 See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 585.
87 Id. at 580.
88 Id. at 586.
89 See generally Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48.
90 Id. at 5, 12.
85
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are lower not only because of savings on professional fees in the
(much) shorter transformation period, but also because the interim
accounting is far less complex.91 In a traditional demutualization,
the company must do (in some cases decades of) comprehensive
accounting of all revenues, their sources, and the equivalent
shareholder positions represented by these contributions to firm
revenue.92 Unsurprisingly, in some cases these records are not
well kept or not up-to-date or are kept in a variety of analog and
digital forms.
A firm transitioning to the mutual holding company form
also needs less spare capital during the transaction period because there is no threat of a hostile takeover (since the mutual
holding company always owns a majority of shares) during what
would otherwise be a period of transition, cash scarcity, and managerial transition; an ideal time for a takeover to occur. 93 On the
other hand, a company undertaking a traditional demutualization and becoming a stock company has all of these disadvantages
from an economic perspective; it absorbs tremendous costs during
a lengthy transition period and is vulnerable to hostile parties accumulating substantial or even majority (in the case of an IPO, in
particular) positions and forcing decisions that are unpopular
among management, customers, or both.94
The economics of switching between the forms can be intimidating, even for well-managed companies with substantial
cash reserves.95 While some of the costs of a full demutualization
are offset by the proceeds of an IPO and some of the costs of the
mutual holding company’s reorganization are offset by the ability
to issue up to forty-nine percent of the voting stock in the enterprise to other parties (through private or public sales), these are
downstream sources of capital not available at the time the demutualization begins.96
Id. at 5, 13.
See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 542.
93 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 12.
94 Glenn S. Daily, Mutual Life Insurance Company Reorganizations: An Overview, GLENNDAILY, http://www.glenndaily.com/mhcoverview.htm#Q10 [https://
perma.cc/HNP2-HK9W].
95 See Olsen, supra note 79, at 368–69.
96 See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 526, 530; Update on Mutual Holding
Companies, supra note 48, at 12.
91

92
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While some argue the tax savings of changing between
structures may represent a substantial savings (the Section 809
advantages of a life insurance mutual becoming a stock company,
for instance, or the accounting for tax-exempt interest in that
same case),97 these savings generally are not—at least in any one
year—significant when compared to the cost of reorganizing a
company of substantial size.98 In general, only companies with
strong affiliations with private equity firms or outside investors
will be able to raise the cash for a mutualization, which is essentially a wholesale buyback and looks very much like a take-private
transaction.99 In a mutualization, one of two things happens: a
mutual holding company reverts (along with its subsidiaries) to
being a traditional mutual, or the equity of a company limited by
shares is gathered and surrendered into a container having the
mutual form.100
Companies with an interest in protecting themselves from
takeover and owning operating companies that are not in their
traditional industries (an insurance company interested in owning
financial services companies, for instance) will choose the mutual
holding company structure.101 The economic incentives to engage
in a traditional, full demutualization and become a stock company
will be compelling for many reasons: substantial financial rewards to management and increased flexibility in future capital
is raised.102 However, the consequences of the restructuring transaction itself are material and the company may be cash-poor or
See IRS Rev. Rul. 99-3, 1999-3 I.R.B. 313 (affecting interpretation and
implications of Internal Rev. Code §§ 808(c)(2), 809).
98 See Daily, supra note 94.
99 Mutualization is dramatically harder to fund than demutualization, as it
requires a mop-up of outstanding equity and front-loaded equity buyback costs
may be hundreds of millions, or even billions, of dollars. There will often be
pressure from stakeholders to not engage in such a buyback-like transaction,
unless current holders of equity see little upside to holding the stock and interest rates are predictably and persistently low. See Marvin Dumon, Why Public
Companies Go Private, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles
/stocks/08/public-companies-privatize-go-private.asp [https://perma.cc/9Y9W
-L266] (explaining that mutualization requires large amounts of cash which is
similar to the type of financing needed for a privatization transaction).
100 See Olsen, supra note 79, at 367–68.
101 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 12, 13.
102 See Daily, supra note 94.
97

2018] MUTUALS: AREA OF LEGAL CLIMATE CHANGE

617

may undergo a managerial transition for several fiscal quarters
while being unable to defend itself from takeover during that time.
CONCLUSION
The reasons for demutualization’s popularity are relatively
clear—capital is substantially more plentiful and affordable for
companies with stock company or stock-company-like forms.103
Companies like mutuals, not-for-profit companies (which by law
cannot pay dividends), and other more unusual forms generally
are penalized with a cost of capital that exceeds, sometimes by a
multiple, that of stock company and mutual holding company
peers.104
At the same time as this difference in cost of capital is stark
as ever, the capital requirements of businesses have increased
markedly.105 Running a large-scale commodities trading floor or
stock exchange in the modern age costs billions of dollars per
year.106 A single hailstorm in Colorado can cost a property and
casualty insurer a billion dollars.107 It is not unusual for a hospital
system to have an operating budget in the hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars.108 These are all businesses that have, at different points in history, been predominantly organized as mutuals.
We suggest the trend toward demutualization will continue as capital markets will continue to favor entities with stock
company or stock-company-like forms that are familiar to analysts,
are seen as more transparent and orthodox in their reporting, and
See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 521.
Id.
105 Yalman Onaran, Capital Requirements, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2017, 1:48
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/banks-leverage-capital-ratios [https://
perma.cc/CDA7-7SDQ].
106 See, e.g., What is the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)?, CORP.
FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading
-investing/new-york-mercantile-exchange-nymex/ [https://perma.cc/L4NP-3738].
107 May 8 Hail Storm Breaks Records At $1.4 Billion in Damage, CBS DENVER
(May 23, 2017, 11:14 AM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2017/05/23/hail-storm-may-8
-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/9RZK-QMTY].
108 See, e.g., A Look at Our Books: Fiscal Year 2015 Capital Budget and Annual Operating Plan, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org
/news/publications/_docs/operating_capital_budget_infographic.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/4H7W-WJZV].
103
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can move quickly to acquire rivals or expand into adjacent market
spaces.109 We further predict that mutuals will not perish, but will
only persist in areas like insurance, farm cooperatives, niche exchanges, and community banking where the demutualization
transaction itself is seen as too risky, too costly, or subjects the
enterprise to unbearable takeover risk.110

109
110

See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 2.
See Daily, supra note 94.

